Transcript

COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
PUBLIC HEARING
HOUSTON, TEXAS
MARCH 6, 2003

BOARD MEMBERS:
Adm. Harold W. Gehman, Jr., Chairman, Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Rear Adm. Stephen Turcotte, Commander, U.S. Naval Safety Center
Maj. Gen. John Barry, Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Maj. Gen. Kenneth Hess, Commander, U.S. Air Force Chief of Safety,
Kirtland Air Force Base
Dr. James Hallock, Aviation Safety Division Chief, U.S. Dept. of Transportation
Dr. Sheila Widnall, Former Secretary of the Air Force,
Professor of Aeronautics, Astronautics and Engineering Systems at MIT
Steven Wallace, Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration
Brig. Gen. Duane Deal, Commander 21st Space Wing, Peterson Air Force Base
G. Scott Hubbard, Director, NASA Ames Research Center
Bryan O'Connor, NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission Assurance
Theron Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Engineer, NASA Headquarters, Washington,
Board Executive Secretary

WITNESS:
Gen. Jefferson Howell, Director, Johnson Space Center

GEHMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The first public hearing of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board is hereby in session.

We are going to begin our review this morning by talking to two officials of NASA who work here at JSC. And we're going to be talking about organizational and lines-of-responsibility kinds of matters, so we have a clear understanding of who does what and how you get it done and who answers to whom.

We're delighted to be able to start right at the top here at JSC with the center director, General Howell.

Jeff Howell, thank you very much for taking time to be here. And we also are aware that you've got duties that are going to call you away here, and those duties, of course, are related to this accident, for which we are understanding and appreciative.

Before we begin, the way we'll conduct this public hearing is Jeff Howell will--Director Howell will make an opening statement, which we'll be delighted to listen to. Then we'll just simply ask questions, as the board sees fit.

Before we begin, though, Mr. Howell, let me first ask you to affirm that the information that you will provide to this board at this hearing will be accurate and complete to the best of your current knowledge and belief.

Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to appear before the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It's now 33 days after the tragic loss of the courageous crew of space shuttle Columbia. We are deeply--we are deeply appreciative of the efforts of the board to determine what caused the loss of Columbia and its crew. And we pledge to continue to cooperate and support your efforts in every possible way.

I'd like to begin by describing Johnson Space Center's role in our nation's space program. Originally named the Manned Spacecraft Center, JSC has served as a focal point for human space exploration since the early 1960s.

The core capabilities resident at JSC since the beginning and continuing today consist of the design, development and test of human spacecraft and human robotics interfaces; planning, execution and control of human spacecraft; selection, training and assignment of astronaut crew members; extravehicular planning of hardware development and training; life science research related to human spaceflight and associated biomedical research; the program management of large-scale human spaceflight hardware development programs; the study and curation of astral materials; and last, but not least, the safety, reliability and quality assurance expertise to support all of these activities.

Within this context, as the director of the Johnson Space Center, I am responsible for providing the shuttle program with the institutional support needed to execute the space shuttle program's mission. The center is accountable for the hardware and software it delivers to the program, as well as the quality and technical content of the analysis products it delivers to the program.

Center management works closely with the space shuttle program manager, Ron Dittemore, and I am regularly apprised of program status and issues as well as personnel and other matters. I will be happy to discuss my understanding of these roles and relationships.

GEHMAN: Thank you very much. I'll ask the first question, since I'm the chairman.

Would you describe for us the lines of authority, the chain of command as we say in the military, the lines of authority that starts with Mr. O'Keefe, a couple of layers above you, or one layer above you, and perhaps one layer or two layers below you?

How does that--describe it, but then if you would expand it to, if there are any branches or sequels (ph), for example, if the money is done differently than the hiring and firing or something like that?

HOWELL: OK. Of course, under Mr. O'Keefe is his deputy administrator, Fred Gregory. And under the two of them, he has his enterprise associate administrators. And Code M, which is the Office of Space Flight, is headed by Bill Readdy. He is my boss. I am one of the Office of Space Flight center directors. We have four: myself, Marshall, Kennedy and Stennis.

And as the center director, below me I have an immediate staff of direct reports, you know, legal, HR, that type. Plus, I have, directors of our major...

... life sciences, and then safety and mission assurance--safety, reliability and quality assurance.

So, those are my major activities, and each of them has a director. Under them are their branch managers and so on. So the largest of those directors is our engineering and then our flight crew operations division. Those are the two largest ones I have.

GEHMAN: And Mr. Readdy also has various projects that direct-report to him also. And we're going to hear from one of those projects later, right?

GEHMAN: So, that means, then, that the way the wiring diagram works out is that the projects and the centers can operate in parallel with each other, is that a safe way to put it?

HOWELL: That's correct. Of course, under him, he has an associate administrator for these programs, General Mike Kostelnik. He has both the shuttle and the space station programs under him. So he's the direct line of authority to Mr. Dittemore.

However, you know, down at our level, Ron Dittemore and I are literally joined at the hip in the way we function, because a big portion of my center personnel support his activities, and we are intertwined in a very complex organization in that regard.

Could you go into a little more detail--a two-part question, really--responsibilities of the astronaut office in regards to your responsibilities, and then could you outline your role before and after the Columbia mishap?

HOWELL: Certainly. The astronaut office is--the actual office is called Flight Crew Operations Directorate. And under--and this is, Bob Cabana is the head of that. Under him, he has several different divisions, but the major one is the flight crew office, the astronaut office.

And so he is charged, under me, to recruit, select and then train our astronauts to get up to a level where they are designated astronauts. They go through a very vigorous, almost a two-year training program to qualify to go on to become a crew of either a shuttle or a station.

So he's charged with the responsibility. And under him are several activities to do that. He has, you know, an aviation division where he has aircraft that our military air crew have to stay current in. And he has the training aircraft for the astronaut pilots that simulate a reentry of a shuttle. They have that type of a capability. All those things.

And so that's--I'm responsible for all of this. He is accountable. He does this for me, in that regard. Is that--does that answer you question?

BARRY: That's something, I think, that few people understand, the difference between Ron Dittemore's responsibilities and your responsibilities for the astronauts.

HOWELL: Yes. Now, Bob, you know, is--has to make sure--has to ensure that his astronauts are ready to perform their functions for Ron as members of shuttle crews.

We share responsibility in that with our Mission Operations Directorate, though. Because, under our Mission Operations Directorate, they're the ones who actually design the missions and build the whole milestone of activities to prepare for the missions and to conduct the missions.

So, the astronauts actually are trained by members of our Mission Operations Division. That's where they get their specific training for the missions they fly on. And so the MOD, under John Harpol (ph), is really the directorate of mine that does that function for them.

So it's a next step beyond being an astronaut now to train for a mission, you're basically directed and under the auspices of the Mission Operations Division, who plan the mission, and they're the same who control them when they're in space.

BARRY: The second part of the question is, you know, could you explain your responsibilities to the board on the stands (ph), like, what is the center director's role insofar as the shuttle mission is concerned? What were you doing before? And just, kind of, a general outline on what responsibilities would be on any normal launch.

HOWELL: Thank you. I don't have any direct responsibility over the shuttle program or the missions themselves. However, we have--as I said before, we're so intertwined with our activities that I have members of my staff and members of my organization who support all of their activities. So I have a responsibility to make sure that they do their jobs directly.

We also, as part of the budget process, we have activities that are defined by the program that they assign to us, and of course we work out a budget with them. And we are given tasks that we have to perform in support of the program.

And of course, I'm responsible for making sure that--it could be hardware products coming out of engineering, it could be software, and also the activities out of MOD. And I have to--I'm responsible to make sure those are done correctly. So I--that's the type of oversight I have in that regard.

Now, on a higher level, I'm also a member of the Office of Space Flight Management Council, and that is under Mr. Readdy. The members are the center directors and his deputy, or associate administrator, Mr. Kostelnik. And we gather on a regular basis to discuss policy, discuss issues, and we all have a voice in that regard. And that's, you know, another indirect oversight that we have in influencing what might occur or not occur in the shuttle program.

We're also--I am also a member of the Flight Review Board, which meets--Flight Readiness Review, to say it correctly--that we meet approximately two weeks prior to every shuttle mission. And we have a very formal, extensive, comprehensive review of every aspect of the mission.

And I'm a voting member of that board. I sit at the table at the FRR, that is chaired by Mr. Readdy. And it's more on the auspices--as a voting member, I can participate in question-and-answers of any of the people who brief it. And also, I have a vote as--it's more of, I guess, on a level of a board of directors, for--and I sign the certificate for flight. So I do have that type of oversight on a personal level, on a direct level.

One of the constant themes that we see and hear about is (ph) talks about the debate between enough resources and staffing to conduct the mission that we've got here. You've laid out for us a pretty articulate description of a very complex, highly matrixed organization.

Could you go into your personal feelings about staffing versus resources in the mission you've been assigned?

HOWELL: Well, I think we're in good shape. We're--there is a--you know, the majority of our people who work at the Johnson Space Center are contract employees. Just to let you know, on site, on a daily basis, we have about 10,000 people working here every day. Three thousand are civil servants; the other 7,000 are contractor people. And even in the surrounding area, in direct support of our activities, are another 6,000 or so contractors who support our activities. So, it's truly a team effort.

And when you--and when I look at that team that we have right now, I am very pleased. I think we have a very highly qualified, gifted, dedicated and committed team of men and women who support our activities and get the job done.

If I have a concern, it's always the balance between civil service and contractor. What is the--you know, I call it a critical--what is the critical mass of civil servants necessary to ensure that we have the proper skills to oversee our contractor activities? I am very confident that we have that at this time.

The issue, of course, always is, within our 3,000 civil servants, our skill level, our experience level--we're in great shape right now.

However, I have a concern, because a very large number of our civil servants are at the age where they may retire in the next several years. So I have that challenge in the future ahead of me.

But as we speak right now, I am very confident in the capabilities and skill levels of our people and our ability to support the shuttle program.

HESS: As a follow-up, you mentioned that one of the direct-reports you have is for the safety and mission assurance area. Could you explain to us how that functions and how it works in parallel during the flight readiness process?

Every activity that supports our human space flight program--each one of my directorates, each one of our contractors--United Space Alliance, Lockheed, Boeing and so on and so on--they all have quality-assurance people, safety people and like, because everybody is totally intent on making this a safe activity at all levels and all the way to the end.

However, because of the critical nature of our activity of having people exposed to this environment, I think it's imperative upon me to have a separate organization--safety, reliability and quality-assurance organization that is an added dimension for oversight to ensure that everybody's really doing their jobs and taking care of business.

And so, they do--there are several facets to this. One is we actually use them to support the program and have actual activities with the review boards and are part of the program team, being with them and participating in design and development just to ensure that, from our point of view, everything's done according to Hoyle.

But another aspect of it is I retain the right, since the astronauts belong to me, I have the right to have my own oversight and activities to ensure that everything, you know, we have done everything we can to reduce the risk to the men and women who go in those machines, as well as the men and women who work with those machines. And so, that is another aspect to that organization. They work for me directly to do that.

So there's a combination. They work in concert with the program to assist them in what they do, but they're also have the right to come to me with any kind of a concerns about anything that might be going on. And I can take that directly to Mr. Readdy or whomever.

Sir, did the shuttle program manager ever report directly to the Johnson Space Center?

HOWELL: It's just less than a year ago, right before I became--I became the center director on 1 April of last year, so I haven't been here quite a year. But right after Mr. O'Keefe became the administrator, the decision was made to take the two major programs in Code M, both the shuttle and station, and move them under the direct leadership of the Johnson Space Center director and up to the deputy associate administrator for space flight.

So, this was--this was, I think, a result of the Young (ph) committee's suggestions and recommendations. And so, that decision was made.

And we went through a transition period when it was already--the transition period had begun when I arrived in April, and by summer, we had moved the total responsibility for those programs under General Kostelnik.

So, it's been fairly recently, if you look over the long term, in the history NASA, this authority has been moved back and forth from the centers to the headquarters a couple of times, I believe. But this was the last iteration of that.

As I understand the shuttle program, there are four centers that really are very much involved with it: your own, Kennedy, Marshall and Stennis. I'm just curious, what kind of interactions you have at your level with these other groups?

HOWELL: We communicate quite regularly. I think it's--sometimes, given what the issues are, I might be communicating every day with Roy Bridges at Kennedy or Art Stevens at Marshall. Other times, we'll go a week or so without talking to each other. So, it really, at our level, we sort of hit the hot buttons and talk to each other over major issues.

At a lower level, we have a continuous liaison, communications and actual integrative work with the other centers with our engineers. We actually have a virtual engineering capability with Marshall, where our engineers and their engineers sit down together and work out problems together on a regular basis.

Our relationship with Kennedy is very close, because, of course, that's where they process the vehicles and work with them. And our astronauts are over there on a continuous basis for training and for familiarization.

So, below me, below our directorate level, there is a continuous flow of information and activity among the centers, where they work with each other on a continual basis.

WIDNALL: OK. I actually have two questions. One's just a point of information. Who does the mission ops directorate report to?

The second question is, you spoke about the Safety and Mission Assurance Organization that works for you, which, as I understand, your description is, basically it's supposed to provide an independent assessment.

Could you give me some examples of major program or mission changes that have occurred as a result of recommendations brought forward by the Safety and Mission Assurance Organization?

And of course I put in the word "major." I have no idea what "major" means. But if you can't answer it now, I guess I would be interested if you could supply some examples for the record.

Another aspect--just because of my capability of having leverage in these things, a lot of issues that they raise are worked out with the programs at a lower level.

So it's a rare occasion when it would actually come to me, because they--you know, every--I probably can't say it sufficiently how important safety is to every person who works at that center. And it's a way of life. You know, you can say it's number-one, first. But it's really--you know, if we were fish, it's the ocean we swim in there. It's an attitude. And so any time anybody raises that flag at any level, it gets people's attention very quickly, and people are going to take care of it.

So it really hasn't been, since I have been the director, I don't really have an example. I do know that those things have happened in the past, and I'll be happy to get something...

(UNKNOWN): Sir, I'd like to have a follow-up question on your discussion about civil service.

Since 1993, according to reports that we've got--I know you participated in this and I'd like you to comment on it, the concept of privatization in the space shuttle program. One of the things that was stated in here is that since 1993 50 percent of the civil service work force has been reduced at NASA.

The specific wording is, "The NASA space shuttle program civil service work force has been reduced nearly 50 percent, resulting in significant loss of skills and experience." It says, "The NASA skill base continues to erode as more functions transition to the space flight operations contract." Now, some of that affects you obviously here.

Could you give us some more information on your views on that and maybe some insight on your participation on this report?

HOWELL: I did not have any participation in that report. I think it goes back to my answer--you know, I can--I'm very comfortable with the balance of civil servants versus contractors we have at this time. And that has been a change from 10 years ago, you know, a move toward contractors, increasing numbers doing functions that were done by civil servants in the days before.

I do have a concern for the future of, you know, once more, what is the critical mass necessary of civil servants in all of the different disciplines that we participate with the programs to ensure that we have enough numbers to grow civil servants up to the expertise they need and so that we can have proper oversight on the civil service level.

And so at this time I'm very comfortable with it. I am very concerned about going any lower on our civil servants. And however, I think it needs more study. I'm not saying we won't, but this is something that we need to really take a hard look at for the future.

You mentioned before in your description of your work force, engineers for example, engineering department, which are largely matrixed in support of the major projects that you have here. Could you describe for us how that works in a practical matter?

What I mean is, if there's an engineering problem that must solved or if one of the project people says, "I need more help here, I need more help there," who decides where the engineers work and how do you get reimbursed for that?

HOWELL: I guess it's a family matter, is the best way to put it. But one of the extraordinary blessings we have here is that we have both the shuttle and station programs here located here, and we support them with our engineering directorate and our other MOD and what have you.

And so, you know, we have--every year they come out with guidelines on what type of support they want. And we tell them what it's going to take to do it, and we work out a budget.

And so we have a force of engineers. We have two types. We have--each program actually has certain people who are assigned to them full time.

And for instance, in the shuttle program, I have 700-plus full-time-equivalent civil servants who work for the shuttle. Now, I don't have the number for it. I'd have to get it for you. Not all 700 of them are full time. There's a certain number of those people who are full time, and then the other number are matrixed work from several people who will take up one full-time equivalent.

We have the same with station. And we budget with them and work out an agreement on what type of work and what it will take to do it. And I agree to the budget, and then we go forward.

And the budgets actually belong to the programs. And so, but we make an agreement.

When something occurs because of the family--for instance, when we had the flow liner cracks--we went to full-court press to figure out what had caused that. We had the metallurgy of that, all the what-ifs. And so we set up a series of tiger teams to help analyze and come to agreement on what it took to fix that problem.

And I would say very easily that it--I took about 150, at least, 150 engineers that were not part of the shuttle program, who came to address that problem, worked full-time for several weeks to take care of that. Now, some of them came from our training people, some from station all along. And we just--it's sort of--it's a legacy of Johnson Space Center is that, you know, you come on and stay on when you get a problem. And everybody turns to do it; everybody knows that that's the way we do it.

How we work that out in the budget, I'll have to bring John Bill (ph), my financial guy, in to tell you. I don't know. But we get it done. And it is paid for.

And there's such great cooperation between the programs that they're willing to, you know, do what it takes to help each other in that regard. I'll have to get you more specifics on, really, the details of how we do that.

GEHMAN: Good. I, for one, would be interested to know how that works out, not so much because I'm really interested in the accounting part of it, but I am interested in the lines-of-authority piece of it.

In other words, the cracks in the piping is a good example, and I certainly can appreciate the energy by which JSC attacks something like that, because it stopped the program for a period of months.

But I would be--I'd like to know better whether or not that tiger team example, as you described it, was working independently, whether if it was working for you, or whether it was working for the project manager. And...

HOWELL: They asked for help. We offered what we could do to help them. They agreed to that, and those people worked for them.

You know, Ron Dittemore was in charge of that operation. We just provide him with a lot of expertise to help him that he didn't normally have to help him solve that problem.

And you know, once more, though, I, you know, I feel a responsibility that those people did the correct thing and came up with the correct analysis and testing. And so, you know, I have something in this. However, they did belong to Ron Dittemore in that regard.

GEHMAN: All right. I hate to jump around subjects here, but you said that you and other center directors, of course, are part of the CFR (ph) process, as I understand...

GEHMAN: And when you do that, of course, you are expressing your overall satisfaction with your, in your sphere of knowledge, that we're ready to go.

But except for that generality, what interests are you actually representing? I mean, are you representing the interests of the astronauts? Are you representing the interests of the engineering department and the flight directors? Or more, less? Have I overstated it?

HOWELL: That is a very somber signing. It is a very--it's very important. And in my mind, I am representing every JSC person who's been involved in that, my confidence in them.

It's also as a member of the management council for Bill Readdy. I feel that I am one of his--I am actually affirming everything that has gone on that I don't really have control over either.

So, I think I'm signing for, for the entire Office of Space Flight, as a member of that board, my approval.

Let me say, though, but before I go to that FRR, every one of my directorates who are involved in the shuttle preparation--MOD, you know, the operations director, the SR and QA (ph), our flight crew operations directorate--all those--engineering--they all have their own separate FRRs, where they go over every detail, every piece of paper that's been processed and every action that's been taken so that they are satisfied in their own minds that this thing is ready to go.

And then they come brief me. I don't have a formal FRR, per se, but we have a meeting and I am given a thorough briefing by all of those heads so I can be confident when I go to that FRR that I can make that vote.

They also raise, you know, issues that have come before, how they have been mitigated, and any issue that might be briefed at the FRR. So I am fully aware of what issues might be raised, and I am ready to go be a participant in there.

TURCOTTE: Sir, following along the lines described about the matrix organization that is NASA, and alluding a little bit to Major General Barry's comments earlier about the privatization process and then the recent organizational changes--and as in any matrix organization, lines of authority and lines of responsibility and, more importantly, lines of resource flow in different directions often.

Could you discuss--do you think--are you in a better position now than you were a couple of years ago as a result of the changes, in order to leverage that matrix organization, to get the things done that you need to do as both, one, as a director and, two, as a signer on the CFR (ph)?

HOWELL: That's a good question. I don't know if I can answer it because I'm a newbie. All I know is what I know since I've been there.

Being a former commander in the Marine Corps, I'd like to be in charge of the whole thing. I am very comfortable with the way this is organized.

Now, I think it was very timely, you know, if I can put on a NASA hat, a Sean O'Keefe hat, and look at, you know, why they decided to change that authority directly up to the office, when you look at what we're going to do in the future, looking at the SLI program that's going to come up, the Arvil (ph) space plant, all those things are going to have to be intertwined and decisions are going to have to be made with all those things affecting each other.

I think it's to NASA's advantage to have the heads of those programs up in Washington where all that can be worked together. And so I think it was a wise move, frankly, if I'm sitting in Sean O'Keefe's chair.

And I'm very comfortable, because of the relationship I have with Code M, with Bill Readdy and Mike Kostelnik, that any issues I might have on budget or what have you, I get a fair hearing, and we get it resolved. So I really, I am very comfortable with our organization, the way it is now.

The privatization, you know, the S-5 (ph) contract, I guess, was a, sort of, a move in that direction. You know, I inherited--the organization I have now is what I inherited almost a year ago. And so, nothing has changed in that regard. And I'm very comfortable with the organization we have now.

BARRY: Sir, a lot of changes have occurred here in the last two or three years. You've cited one, about the center director responsibilities being shifted. The other one is the movement of the contractor support from Huntington Beach to JSC.

Could you comment on a little bit about that and your concerns, if any, about that move, particularly in regards to expertise, qualifications of the folks? And has that strengthened you? Advantages and disadvantages, maybe?

HOWELL: I think the move was really a very wise move by Boeing to move to get more central and get closer to their customer with the people who need to serve them.

There is a concern though that, you know, he left a lot of expertise back in California; a lot of people didn't want to move. Mike Mott (ph) and I have a lot of discussions about that. He's assured me that he is bringing in the right kind of expertise to--that we can be confident in his products and what he's going to do.

So, I think he's got--I think what he did was the right thing to do. There is friction and a hiccup. Anytime you do something like that, things are, at first, they're not quite as good as they were before. But I think he has a very excellent plan to get back on the step and be just as strong as he was and actually better, because he's going to have a more centralized organization that can respond a lot quicker to the needs of the program.

BARRY: Just as a follow-up, did you have any involvement at all, that you can comment and give us some help on trying to understand--I know we'll talk a little bit about this with Mr. Dittemore--but when the OMM (ph) effectively was moved from Palmdale to KSC, were you involved in that decision, advice-wise, providing some counsel and your input?

HOWELL: No, I really wasn't. That was, that decision was made before I became the center director. So I had no involvement in it.

Could you describe your role in issues like the resolution of in-flight anomalies, the design or material waivers that need to be granted, what I would refer to as escapements, which basically means approving hardware that, for one reason or another, just does not meet spec, or in a situation where something happened on a flight that maybe shouldn't have happened or is not understood?

Could you describe your role in that, and then also indicate whether there is a formal process for resolution of those anomalies--in the general sense, anomaly...

HOWELL: Well, we have a mission management team which is tasked with on a daily basis having oversight over the mission and taking care of anomalies and mitigating any kind of problems they might have while they are on a mission or in space.

I am not involved in that directly. However, I have several of my directory boards, from engineering, from MOD, and other of my directorates are on that team. And so, I have a sense of responsibility to make sure we have the right people on that team.

But those are really experts at what they do. It's a very robust organization. At the MMT, you'll have a table, and I'm not sure how many--let's say a dozen people at the table, but I assure you, behind each one of those people are at least a dozen other engineers dedicated to help them resolve whatever issues they have.

This is really serious business, and we commit a very robust engineering and operations team anytime we have a mission ongoing. And so, at--but it's at an expert, technical level of our best technicians who do that. And so I am not a part of that. I certainly, I don't have the qualities to be a part of that. But I feel responsible to make sure we have the right people.

WIDNALL: Well, I'm not just talking about what happens in flight. I'm also talking about as the vehicle is certified for being ready in flight and some of the, you know, the issues of hardware that doesn't quite, for one reason or another, meet some original specification, and there's a waiver granted of some sort.

HOWELL: Well, we are--because of our involvement with the program and participation in almost every aspect of its activities, I have people who are involved in all of those issues, I get regular briefings about them. Anytime there are any issues like that, I'm aware of them.

And Ron Dittemore and I tag up every week, and we'll discuss these things together. And if I have any concerns, I'll let him know those things.

And so, we work--I am continuously apprised of any anomalies or issues that might be going on in preparation for a mission or anything like that.

HESS: General, you've done a very good job this morning explaining to us how this highly complex organization comes together and talked a little bit about the structure and the resources that you have.

My question would be, here, next year, the space station is supposed to be core complete. And I'd like you to talk to the board a little bit about stresses to maintain schedule and impacts that you see out there in the future.

HOWELL: Well, we have been, at Johnson--I have to be very careful what I say because I've been accused of being too success-oriented, and that's sort of the nature of the beast at our center.

One thing we have going for us, though, is we have an administrator who is just beating upon us how important safety is, and that it should be our first primary consideration in everything we do. And he starts every meeting saying that, and he ends every meeting saying that. We are very eager and excited about getting this station assembled.

And the missions--I got to be careful, I get carried away. You know, the complexity of these assembly missions is astounding for me, watching how our people, with the program, put these things together with the other centers, and take this very huge complex machinery up into space, get it connected and operating. It's phenomenal.

I think it's one of the most greatest achievements in the history of humankind, frankly. That's my opinion. And so, I'm excited about that. And we're eager to get on with it and get that done.

However, we understand the stakes. And we are not going to do anything, impress anybody to press, you know, to put aside any kind of quality-assurance or safety issues. I think that was very evident.

Our administrator declared that, you know, we're going to have core complete by February of '04, and we wanted to make that happen. However, we had a floor liner crack and we came to parade rest until we got that done. That was several weeks, almost months that we had the beaster (ph) ball issue. Stopped; never a peep or a complaint from our administrator or higher headquarters.

They understood that those things have to be resolved before we're going to commit people to flight.

So I'm just very comfortable with the attitude of our whole organization, from the top person down, of what is really important and what our priorities are.

HESS (?): General Howell, I would, with some degree of hesitancy, speak for the board here in which the general impression of the board is we have traveled to all of the centers involved in the manned space flight center, walked on the production floors and crawled through orbiters and met all levels of NASA and contractor employees, that the board generally agrees with your assessment of safety, what I would call tactical safety. If somebody finds something wrong, there's no pressure or hesitation to go fix it.

But critics of NASA, while admitting that you have a very enviable and rigorous and mature safety program, also sometimes say that NASA misses the big safety issues--that is, that the process of repeatedly fixing things and then certifying the fix to make sure that it's better than original, that sometimes you tend to miss the trends that you shouldn't have ever had to address that problem at all, that whatever it is that you're working on was not designed to fail, and the fact that you're working on it is telling another story.

Would you just give me your views of whether or not this is not well-informed advice or how you satisfy yourself that you've got an eye open, not only for the snake that's right at your ankle but what's over the hill?

I know it's a hard question to get at, but I'd just like your personal views of whether or not these critics are telling us something.

HOWELL: We have, on a daily basis, when I meet--when I have a chance--I've got such a great team--we sort of gather together in the end of the day and over a cup of coffee and talk about things, and we discuss these types of things.

And I think if the critics will look at us--you know, one thing, we are tactical because we're trying to support the programs and get their mission accomplished. So that is--we focus on that. And I agree, we're taking care of business today.

At the same time, I think people might fail to recognize that we have set up at NASA headquarters and we have people on teams right now as we speak working on future spacecraft, on modifications.

You know, Mike Kostelnik has a very energized activity going on now, looking at what it would take to have a service life extension for the shuttle to take care of these things that might be popping up that we didn't know about, modifications, safety modifications and reliability modifications we might do to this vehicle to keep it going to service the station.

Because we realize our predictions are the station, to be viable, is going to need a machine that can carry a lot of stuff up there. And that's what the shuttle does better than anything else that we come up with.

So you know, these are not things that are on the headlines. These are things that working groups are working on, and until we make decisions, they're not going to be in the press or in Aviation Week. But I assure you that there are some very good minds working on this. Some of our best talent from my center are up at headquarters working on these types of activities we speak.

And we're working on an architecture for the future. And so, not only Sean O'Keefe looking at what we can do to our present machines to improve them, the next machines to be better, but we are also looking at what we'll be doing 20 years from now. And so, I would hate to think that people are claiming that we're too short-sighted.

As far as safety goes, you know, if we had you know, 200 more quality-assurance people who could look over the shoulder of everybody, maybe we'd be safer. There's that balance that you know is on selling ships. If you keep all the ships in the harbor, none of them are ever going to--you're not going to lose any of them.

And so, you always have that terrible dilemma in a position of authority of how much is enough, are we ready to go? I think we have some very serious people and very well-educated and qualified people making these decisions. And I'm just very--I feel very fortunate to be on this team.

(UNKNOWN): One question. Sir, if you could just comment and have an opportunity to talk about the budget. And I know you've only been in the job for about a year or so, but you know, how it's transcended in your mind, and what's the prospect for the future. Particularly in any budget distinctions between the shuttle and the space station that you might be able to comment on.

HOWELL: Well, the--right before I got here--see, I can cast this stone because I wasn't here--it was obvious to many people that our budget at NASA had gotten in disarray and it was very difficult for us to really identify what it cost to do things, to get things done.

And that was one of the first things, chores, that Sean O'Keefe did when he got in here, was to pin us down as an organization and find out exactly what it would take to achieve things that we said we were going to take and what is it going to cost to do those things, and then to say, "Do we have the budget to do those things?"

And so we had to cut some things out because we really didn't have the money to pay for things we said we were going to do. And that's just flat not good business. You can't do that in your household and you can't do it at NASA either.

So he brought budgetary discipline to NASA. Came under a lot of criticism by people because he says: I don't need anymore money right now, I just want to see how I can spend the money I have.

I think we have come through that. And I think, if you look at the president's budget submission, he actually modified it to ensure that the shuttle and the station both would have the adequate funding over the next couple of years to accomplish the missions that we've set out for them over the next several years.

Now, I think, as we go forward, we are going to be in a lot better posture to predict proper budgetary accounts toward these things so that we will have credibility when we say we need this much for this and this much for that.

I think we're in good shape, because he, you know, he adjusted. We were concerned over the next couple of years if we were really going to have adequate funding for both shuttle and station operations that we had projected. And he adjusted, within NASA, funds from other programs to ensure we could that. So I think we're in good shape.

TETRAULT (ph): I have a continuing question on the budget, just to be sure I understand it. It was my understanding that the budget, or at least the budget for the shuttle and the space station, are on a project basis--you got the engineers or Johnson engineers, so there must be some transfer of funds that goes back and forth between the projects and the center. So that's my first question.

My second question is, it's also my understanding that NASA is going to a full costing basis, which they haven't done before. And I'd like your ideas on what kind of a difference that's going to make in terms of how you operate.

HOWELL: The first question first. We have a, you know, an institution with a certain number of engineers. And we forecast a certain number of them will be working for the different programs, and their budget's paid for their services for those people.

However, there is a pool of talent in the different disciplines we have that is funded by institutional money. So I actually have an institutional budget that is separate from the program funding so that I can maintain certain core capabilities that withstand, you know, the give and take and the ups and downs of utilization or not.

So that's sort of my buffer to ensure that I can maintain a certain skill level, whether or not the program needs them today or not, when they're going to need them tomorrow. So there's that kind of give and take that goes on. I don't know if I can be more specific more than that.

However, you know, a lot of budget decisions are made on what you did last year and the year before and what you project. And so that's the type of--you know, we match our full-time equivalents, our civil servants, and then, of course, the program--the contractors have to do the same thing with their own businesses, what's going to be needed by the programs. And then we have to bargain with them over what we need to do to do the task that's given us. And then, they give us the money for that.

And now on the other aspect, full cost accounting, that's going to be a great new adventure for Johnson Space Center and for all of NASA. And we're going to roll into that into our next budget year. And I, frankly, I am learning about it as quickly as I can. And I would hate to try to tell you what I know about it right now because I'm very ignorant. So I'm afraid I can't really answer that question for you.

As you have indicated, over the years the great majority of work that's done on the space flight programs is now done by contractors, most of it under a great omnibus contract with this USA alliance, this SFOC contract.

What's the NASA mechanism for determining the contractor's performance, is there a board or a committee? And who decides whether they get bonuses or penalties and things like that?

HOWELL: Each of the contracts has a contract official who grades them and manages them. The programs themselves grade them on their performance.

Of course, each contract is a little different, whether they get fee or whether it's fixed price or what have you. But each contract has a government official, usually who's with the program or project that they're contracted to, who actually grades them on their performance and determines their fee.

Now, the fee-determining goes up to a next level for approval. And so, we are involved in that because we have people on my staff, senior people, who are actually reviewing officials to approve those determinations.

HOWELL: Yes, we do. And we have several contracts of people who do work for us on the center, and we also have fee-determining officials. And they are always reviewed. And of course, we have to get our headquarters, has to put a stamp of approval on it. So it's always the higher headquarters reviews these to make sure that we've made the right decision. And these folks, if they are upset about it, they can protest and have it reviewed further.

On behalf of the board, we'd like to thank you for rearranging your travel schedule to be here today. And we'd also like to thank you for the wonderful support that JSC has provided to us during our two and a half weeks or three weeks that we've been here in Houston. It has been wonderful and it continues.

The board's getting larger and we're digging deeper into your backyard and we appreciate your cooperation and the energy which all of your folks have supported us. I want to go on record as saying the support has been outstanding.